Demographic change and the 2016 presidential election by Maggio, Christopher
 1 

















































The election of Donald Trump raised many questions about the impact of immigration on 
American politics. This article asks whether backlash to demographic change in counties 
undergoing rapid growth in foreign-born, Hispanic, and/or Asian populations may have played a 
role in his election. I use techniques accounting for selection into treatment to examine the 
relationship between demographic changes at the county level and voting patterns in the 2016 
presidential election. Analyzing individual-level survey data and controlling for voting patterns 
in 2012, I find that people living in counties with a rapid percentage point increase in the 
Hispanic population since 2000 were more likely to vote for Trump in the general and primary 
elections. For non-Hispanic Whites in the general election, Hispanic growth is predictive of 
Trump voting among those with lower levels of education and higher family incomes, as well as 
those living in counties with smaller Hispanic populations in 2000 ("new destinations"). There is 
also evidence of backlash to Hispanic growth among Asian voters. When analyzing county-level 
election results, I again find an uptick in Trump voting in high Hispanic growth counties for the 
general election, but these results do not replicate for the swing states, or for the primaries. This 
provides reason to be cautious about claims that backlash against local demographic trends 
“won” Trump the election, though data limitations prevent me from analyzing all key locations 
individually. Regardless, this study provides clear evidence of an impact of local demographic 
change on contemporary U.S. politics.  
 





1. Introduction  
 
 During the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump ran a campaign 
highly focused on immigration, usually with a negative framing (Lamont, Park, and Ayala-
Hurtado 2017). In contemporary political history, restrictionist attitudes toward immigration, 
particularly with regard to undocumented immigration, have been an important position of many, 
though not all, in the Republican party (Wroe 2008). However, as this unconventional candidate 
was wont to do, Trump amplified the rhetoric around immigrants as well as racial, ethnic, and 
religious minorities in ways that discomforted some Republicans (Diamond 2015; Ye Hee Lee 
2015). Some predicted that comments such as these, among other types of controversial 
statements, would contribute to derailing the Trump campaign (Kruse and Gee 2016). Given 
Trump’s surprise victory in the 2016 election, it worth investigating the role that immigration 
played in this outcome. 
 This paper addresses trends in immigration and Hispanic/Asian population growth since 
2000 and quantifies what impacts these trends may have had on the 2016 presidential election. 
There is ample evidence that concerns about immigration and racial/ethnic demographic change 
are important to understanding support for Trump (Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich 2018; 
Mutz 2018; Sides 2017; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). However, analysts have often pointed 
out that localities with higher foreign-born populations were actually less likely to vote for 
Trump (Flowers 2016). Various factors likely account for this relationship, including the impact 
of immigrants and their children, many of whom are racial minorities, on the electorate 
(Holbrook and Park 2018; Krogstad and Lopez 2016; Pew Research Center 2012; Sides 2017). 
Immigrants also tend to live in larger metropolitan areas, places that were unlikely to vote for 
Trump (Florida 2015; Scala and Johnson 2017). For non-Hispanic Whites specifically, the 
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relationship between Trump support and living in a diverse place is complex, and may depend on 
certain individual characteristics such as party identification, as well as which out-groups Whites 
live near, the level of geography analyzed, the level of segregation, local economic context, 
selection bias, and how these relate to the contrasting predictions of group threat and intergroup 
contact (Allport 1954; Blalock 1967; Knowles and Tropp 2018; Newman, Shah, and 
Collingwood 2018; Reny, Collingwood, and Valenzuela 2019; Rothwell 2016; Rothwell and 
Diego-Rosell 2016). 
 However, others have focused not on the size of the local immigrant-origin population, 
but instead on the rapid demographic change occurring in many places. In an op-ed entitled 
“How Immigration Foiled Hillary,” Thomas Edsall addresses the impact of demographic change 
in new immigrant destinations on the 2016 presidential election. Edsall draws on work from 
Newman (2013) to argue that the turn towards Trump may be particularly strong in places that 
are less diverse but that have recently been diversifying. Additionally, various studies from 
different contexts and levels of analysis have found a positive relationship between rapid 
immigration/demographic change and voting for far right candidates (Arzheimer 2009; Becker 
and Fetzer 2017; Enos 2017; Swank and Betz 2003). Enos (2017) finds a positive relationship 
between Hispanic percent growth at the county level and Trump voting (for Anglo Democrats in 
individual-level survey data), as well as the shift from Romney to Trump (for county level 
election results), but the analyses are very limited in their use of control variables. Reny, 
Collingwood, and Valenzuela (2019) focus on the relationship between Latinx growth at the 
county level and vote switching for Trump among Whites who voted for a non-Romney 
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candidate in 2012.1 The authors find some evidence of a positive relationship between percent 
Latinx growth and switching to Trump (for White Democrats without a four-year degree in 
particular). While this relationship is statistically significant, the estimate is extremely imprecise. 
Hill, Hopkins, and Huber (2019) find evidence that Hispanic and non-citizen immigrant 
population growth at the hyper-local precinct level likely helped Clinton on balance, but analyze 
a limited number of states and do not analyze individual-level voting patterns. Additionally, 
various recent studies from the U.S. have demonstrated a link between rapid demographic 
change and negative immigration attitudes (Hopkins 2010; Newman 2013), as well as expressed 
support for Trump (Newman, Shah, and Collingwood 2018), both under certain conditions in 
particular.  
 I provide a unique contribution to the literature on immigration and electoral outcomes by 
addressing demographic change and Trump voting through a more causal framework. 
Specifically, I employ techniques intended to account for selection effects that may influence 
both where immigrants, Hispanics, and Asians tend to move as well as voting patterns.2 This 
provides a robust test of the effect of immigration or the increase in Hispanic/Asian population 
shares on local voting patterns. I also analyze various samples not specifically addressed by the 
above studies of the 2016 election, including racial minority respondents and counties with 
different pre-existing racial/ethnic makeups. I find no evidence of an electoral backlash caused 
by foreign-born or Asian population growth. However, using individual-level survey data from 
the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), I find that people living in a county with 
a large percentage point increase in the Hispanic population since 2000 were more likely to vote 
                                                
1 The authors examine the impact for foreign-born growth in the appendix and find no 
statistically significant results. 
2 This is not to say that the studies mentioned above make no efforts to account for selection into 
treatment, but none do so in as rigorous a way as will be outlined in the current study. 
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for Trump in the general and primary elections (caucuses included). The general election 
increase in Trump voting is specifically found among non-Hispanic Whites and Asians. Among 
non-Hispanic Whites, the relationship is concentrated among those with both relatively low 
levels of education and relatively high levels of family income. I also find that non-Hispanic 
Whites living in counties with lower shares of Hispanics as of 2000 were considerably more 
likely to vote for Trump if that county subsequently experienced rapid Hispanic population 
growth. I additionally find a positive relationship between Hispanic growth and Trump voting in 
the general election when analyzing county-level election results from Election Atlas, but find no 
such relationship in the general election swing states or in the primaries. Similar general election 
results emerge from the CCES for various swing state subsamples, though every key location 
cannot be examined separately. Ultimately, although there is evidence of a positive relationship 
between Hispanic growth and Trump voting, I recommend caution when evaluating any 
argument that suggests that local increases in Hispanics, Asians, and/or immigrants “won” 
Trump the election. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Immigrant Threat Narrative  
 Politicians and political activists in the United States have long drawn on immigrant 
threat narratives as a strategy to gain popular support as well as to aid in the enactment of 
restrictive policies toward immigrants and immigration (Lee 2002; Ngai 1999). In its 
contemporary iteration in the United States, the immigrant threat narrative has most obviously 
been directed at the Latinx population. Massey and Pren (2012) trace this process back to the 
termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 and its phase-out from 1965-1967. This guest 
worker program offered a legal method for Mexicans to work in the United States. When this 
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pathway was closed and additional immigration restriction was implemented, undocumented 
immigration rose and narratives about a border invasion took off (Chavez 2001; 2008). In their 
analysis, Massey and Pren (2012, p. 4) demonstrate that, in the post-Bracero period, there was a 
large increase in “instances in which the words ‘undocumented,’ ‘illegal,’ or ‘unauthorized’ were 
paired with ‘Mexico’ or ‘Mexican immigrants’ and the words ‘crisis,’ ‘flood,’ or ‘invasion,’” 
across four major newspapers. As Massey and Pren (2012) document, politicians also 
participated in this narrative. For instance, Governor Pete Wilson of California framed Mexican 
immigration to California as an “invasion” and Ronald Reagan connected undocumented 
immigration with national security concerns. Though both major political parties have promoted 
a threat narrative regarding the border, the contemporary Republican Party has certainly taken up 
this mantle more aggressively, and Trump has helped to center the most extreme version of this 
narrative in the American consciousness. 
2.2. The Effect of Demographic Change on Electoral Outcomes 
 Newman and Velez (2014) do well to describe the process by which many scholars have 
turned to demographic change as opposed to demographic group size as a key explanatory 
variable for various forms of immigration backlash, drawing much from prior work by Hopkins 
(2010). Rooted in the work of  Key (1949) and Blalock (1967), various scholars have put forth 
that minority group size can generate power threat in the majority population, but the empirical 
evidence has been mixed on this as it relates to the size of Hispanic and Asian populations 
(Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Fox 2004; Taylor 1998). While a baseline level of local diversity 
may be viewed as acceptable, particularly when accounting for self-selection (Gould 2000), rapid 
changes in local diversity may upset the status quo and lead individuals to re-evaluate their 
orientation toward the community (Hopkins 2009). Moreover, people often notice change more 
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than the absolute state, to which they may have become accustomed to and use as a point of 
reference (Helson 1964; Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
 Given the points laid out above, many scholars began to view demographic change as 
important in various respects, such as the likelihood of adoption of restrictive policies toward 
immigrants (Newman et al. 2012), local voting around taxes and public spending (Hopkins 
2009), and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (Hopkins 2010; Newman 2013). If 
negative attitudes toward immigrants are triggered by demographic change under certain 
conditions, voters may express such sentiments by casting their ballots for a political party or 
candidate that echoes these sentiments. Indeed, various empirical studies across different 
contexts and levels of analysis have found evidence that inflows of immigration are associated 
with (and perhaps provoke) increases in conservative or far-right voting (Arzheimer 2009; 
Becker and Fetzer 2017; Enos 2017; Swank and Betz 2003). Notably, some of the results in this 
literature are conditional on various factors, such as how urban the location is (Dustmann, 
Vasilieva, and Piil 2019) and the socioeconomic status of the immigrant group (Edo et al. 2019; 
Mayda, Peri, and Steingress 2018).3 An additional caveat is that the coefficients in these studies 
vary in size and some find little evidence that immigration flows were, ultimately, particularly 
impactful (Becker and Fetzer 2017). Despite this, and despite the fact that not all studies show 
any impact on conservative voting at all (Arzheimer and Carter 2006), there is a substantial body 
of evidence confirming the hypothesis that conservative voting is tied to immigration threat and 
the magnitudes in these studies are often quite substantial. 
 The question of whether immigration causes conservative or far right voting is another 
matter. Most innovatively, various authors have used natural experiment, difference in 
                                                
3 Edo et al. (2019) also find nationality to be important. 
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difference, instrumental variable, propensity score matching, and/or synthetic control group 
approaches to answer this question (Becker and Fetzer 2017; Dustmann, Vasilieva, and Piil 
2019; Edo et al. 2019; Mendez and Cutillas 2014; Thompson 2019). The difficulty that these 
authors are attempting to overcome is that the places where immigrants and immigrant-origin 
groups choose to live may vary systematically in ways that are related to voting patterns. I 
attempt to solve this problem by using techniques that account for selection into particular 
geographical areas by inverse-weighting observations according to the likelihood of the county 
having been a high migration or Hispanic/Asian growth setting in the 2000 to 2010-2014 period. 
 One additional study is worth noting in particular. Newman, Shah, and Collingwood 
(2018) use inflammatory comments by Donald Trump relatively early in his campaign to test the 
effect of activation of anti-Latinx sentiments and determine whether this activation might be 
more effective in counties with rapidly growing Latinx populations. The authors find that living 
in such a county was positively predictive of support for Trump among Republicans and 
Republican-leaners after, but not before, said comments. This fits well with other research on 
demographic change and political activation. For instance, Hopkins (2010) finds that restrictive 
sentiment is more highly correlated with immigrant growth during times when immigration is 
more nationally salient due to its level of coverage in the media. In other words, politicians and 
the media can help make salient the link between immigration growth and anti-immigrant 
sentiment and/or right wing voting. 
Such a framing effect is exemplified not only by the focus of Trump in his campaign on 
the issue of undocumented immigration (Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado 2017), for instance, 
but also by the evidence that immigration became important for Trump voting in a way that it 
was not in the most recent presidential election prior. For instance, according to Sides (2017, 4), 
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“attitudes about immigration, feelings toward black people, and feelings toward Muslims4 
became more strongly related to voter decision making [for Whites] in 2016 compared to 
2012....The greater salience of attitudes related to race, ethnicity, and religion arguably derives 
from a campaign far more focused on immigration and the threat of terrorism than the 2012 
campaign was.” 5 In the case of the current study, I hypothesize that Trump’s public framing may 
have primed a backlash effect, and that such an effect may be reflected in his likelihood of 
capturing votes in places that have undergone rapid demographic change. Lastly, it is worth 
noting that, although the focus of the Trump campaign was clearly on Hispanic migration, it is 
worth analyzing Asian migration as well given Trump’s anti-China rhetoric that could be viewed 
through an anti-Asian framework (Mirilovic and Kim 2017; Stracqualursi 2017), and more 
generally because of the importance of comparing the reception of Hispanic and Asian 
immigration in the contemporary United States (Ha 2010; Pew Research Center 2015).  
3. Data 
 To answer the questions posed in this study, I use multiple data sources. First, I analyze 
individual-level survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) from 
2016 (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). The CCES was fielded in two waves, one just before 
the 2016 general presidential election and one just after. It provides a large sample of U.S. 
citizen adults for whom there is voting (or non-voting) information and post-election survey 
weights for the 2016 general presidential election (N = 51,690). Crucially, it also asks about 
voting behavior from the 2012 presidential election and provides county-level residential 
information. Next, I analyze county-level election results for the 2016 and 2012 presidential 
                                                
4 Feelings toward Muslims is not, however, a statistically significant predictor in the 2016 model. 
5 Mutz (2018) reaches a somewhat different conclusion on this matter in terms of immigration 
attitudes, but certainly does not deny the importance of immigration attitudes in the 2016 
election. 
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elections from David Leip’s Election Atlas (Leip 2013; 2017). These data sets have voting 
information from over 3,000 counties and county-equivalent geographies. For the current study, 
the sample size of both of these datasets is reduced due to the exclusion of Alaska, whose voting 
results from Election Atlas are not reported by its closest county equivalent (boroughs). The 
sample sizes are reduced further due to a small amount of missing data on certain variables. I 
merge the above data sets with the 2000 Census and the 2006-2010 and 2010-2014 American 
Community Surveys, which provide the treatment variables reflecting demographic change 
across counties, as well as other control variables, either directly from these sources or 
constructed from them (U.S. Census Bureau 2011; 2015; 2001). Newman and Velez (2014) 
provide evidence that demographic change at the county level is highly noticeable to residents, 
justifying the use of this geographic unit when analyzing the relationship between demographic 
changes and voting outcomes. I choose the 2000 to 2010-2014 period of demographic change for 
the main analysis to allow for a substantial period for demographic change to generate and to 
maximize comparability with key studies in this area (Enos 2017; Newman, Shah, and 
Collingwood 2018; Reny, Collingwood, and Valenzuela 2019). 
4. Research Questions 
 The research questions for this study are as follows: 
1. Were individuals living in counties undergoing rapid demographic change since 2000 
more likely to vote for Trump in the 2016 presidential general election, controlling for 
their voting (or non-voting) in 2012? This analysis uses the CCES. 
2. Are there differential impacts of demographic change depending on the group of voters 
or potential voters? This includes the impact of demographic change on subsamples of 
respondents based on voting patterns in 2012, race/ethnicity, levels of education and 
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family income, and the pre-existing racial/ethnic demographic makeup of their county in 
2000. This analysis uses the CCES. 
3. Did demographic change have an impact on voting patterns in the 2016 Republican 
primaries?6 I compare Trump’s success to all other candidates using the CCES.  
4. Do impacts of demographic change appear in actual county-level election results for 
2016, controlling for results from 2012? In addition to the full set of counties, I also 
examine the “traditional” swing states, as designated by Silver (2016).7 Alternatively, 
might there be an effect of demographic change on electoral outcomes that pre-dated 
Trump? To answer this question, I analyze the relationship between demographic change 
and results in the 2012 election controlling for results in the 2000 election. These 
analyses use Election Atlas. 
5. I return to the CCES to assess the impact of demographic change on several additional 
samples that might be especially important in evaluating the impact of demographic 
change on the 2016 election: the swing states that Trump won, counties within the swing 
states and the swing states that Trump won that also have a high citizen voting age 
population, and individual swing states where possible (Florida and Pennsylvania).8  
5. Methodology 
                                                
6 For all analyses of the Republican primaries, I include states that hold caucuses (though 
obviously not conventions), but not states whose primaries/caucuses were ultimately 
meaningless, those that held them after Trump had effectively won the nomination (California, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and West 
Virginia). By controlling for state of residence, I account for any specific features of state 
primaries or caucuses that may be important. 
7 This includes Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
8 I analyze only Florida and Pennsylvania as individual states primarily due to concerns about 
sample size overall and/or for certain categories of certain variables. 
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 As stated, to analyze the key questions of this study, I examine the relationship between a 
county having high growth in foreign-born, Hispanic, or Asian share of the population from 2000 
to 2010-2014 and voting for Trump using both individual-level survey data and county-level 
election results. I use two techniques accounting for selection into treatment: augmented inverse-
probability-weighting (AIPW) and inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) 
(Huber and Drukker 2015). The goal here is to inverse weight counties according to their 
probability of having experienced a high rate of growth in the share of the population that is 
foreign-born/Hispanic/Asian since 2000, with the treatment group having actually experienced 
this large demographic change and the control group having experienced much more modest 
growth in their foreign-born/Hispanic/Asian population share, or even no growth or negative 
growth in some cases. This is done in an effort to make the treatment and control groups more 
similar in terms of characteristics predicting selection into treatment and, in theory, isolating the 
effect of the treatment variable. This accounts for the possibility that high and low growth 
counties may differ from each other in various ways and “selection” into high or low growth may 
be correlated with voting patterns. The AIPW and IPWRA methods accomplish these goals in 
somewhat different ways (see StataCorp 2013 and Huber and Drukker 2015 for detailed 
explanations), and using both methods in this study will provide robustness checks on the results.   
5.1. Key Variables 
 For the analysis of individual-level survey data, I employ binary outcomes indicating 
whether someone voted for Trump or not. In the primary analysis on the full sample, the group 
who did not vote for Trump includes those who voted for another candidate or did not vote at all. 
I include non-voters as a group that may have been influenced in their decision to not vote by 
similar factors as those who chose to vote for a particular candidate, including demographic 
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change. I use this expansive definition as a way to identify initial relationships in the general 
sample, and then perform robustness checks to ensure that the results replicate to other 
definitions of Trump voting. These include voting for Trump vs. voting for another candidate 
and voting for Trump vs. voting for Hillary Clinton, Trump’s only competitive challenger. For 
the analyses of the county-level election results, the outcomes include the percentage of a 
particular county that voted for Trump, as well as the percentage point difference between 
Trump and Clinton. I also analyze vote percentage for Mitt Romney in 2012 at the county level. 
The primary treatment variables are binary variables representing counties with high rates 
of growth in their foreign-born, Hispanic, and Asian population shares. I use a binary treatment 
variable in all models to match the binary treatment in the analyses accounting for selection into 
treatment. I generally (though not always)9 define “high growth” counties as counties in the top 
quartile of percentage point growth from 2000 to 2010-2014 for Trump voting, and from 2000 to 
2006-2010 for Romney voting.  
5.2. Controls 
 For every model, I employ controls that may be correlated with the treatment and 
outcome. For the analysis of individual-level survey data, I control for education, family income, 
employment status, race/ethnicity, Hispanic identification, immigrant generation, gender, birth 
year, current/former union membership, parental/guardian status (children under 18), marital 
status, state of residence, and length of current residence so as to account for selection in and out 
of places of residence that may be correlated with key variables in this study. As additional 
contextual variables, I control for the population density (in quartiles) and labor force 
                                                
9 I use different formulations of this variable where necessary for the purposes of maintaining a 
reasonable sample size for relevant categories and achieving convergence. I note in all tables 
which formulation is being used. 
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participation (age 16+) in a respondent’s county, as well percent foreign-born, Hispanic, or Asian 
in 2000, depending on the treatment variable. I also control for population movements in and out 
of these counties that might be important: U.S.-born, non-Hispanic, or non-Asian population 
change from 2000 to 2010-2014, respectively, depending on the treatment variable. Lastly, I 
control for who the respondent voted for in 2012, as well as the percentage of their county that 
voted for Romney in 2012. The former includes an “other” category for those who did not vote 
in 2012, were too young to vote in 2012, voted for someone besides Romney or Obama, or it is 
uncertain who they voted for.10  
 For the analysis of county-level election results, I control for the percent foreign-born, 
Hispanic, and Asian for different years depending on the model. If I am examining the impact of 
high Hispanic growth, for instance, I control for percent foreign-born and Asian in 2010-2014 (or 
2006-2010 in the 2012 election models) and control for percent Hispanic in 2000. The idea here 
is that the percent Hispanic in 2000 captures that population at the beginning of the growth 
period, which may be related to subsequent growth, and the treatment variable captures the 
increase over time. I also control for percent non-Hispanic Black, the percent with at least a 
bachelor’s degree (age 25+), the population density (in quartiles), median household income (in 
quartiles), median household income growth since 2000, percent in the labor force (age 16+), 
percent never married (age 15+), percent age 65 or older, percent female, and state of residence. 
Again, I control for the population growth/decline of U.S.-born, non-Hispanic, and non-Asian 
populations to account for selection in and out of particular counties, as appropriate. For the 
models predicting the percent voting for Trump, I control for the percent of the population that 
                                                
10 A small number of respondents who were too young to vote in 2012 claim to have voted for 
Obama or Romney. I code them as having voted for these candidates as a way to capture their 
preference, even if they could not actually vote. 
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voted for Romney in 2012 as a gauge of voting preferences in the recent past, and for the models 
predicting the difference between Trump and Clinton voting, I control for the difference between 
Romney and Obama voting in 2012. For the analysis of the 2012 election, all relevant controls 
are from 2006-2010 instead of 2010-2014, and prior voting patterns are captured by the percent 
that voted for George Bush in 2000. The purpose here is to control for voting preferences at the 
beginning of the period of demographic change so as to determine if Republicans may have 
captured electoral gains from backlash against demographic change prior to Trump.  
5.3. Predicting Selection into Treatment 
 To predict selection into treatment for the AIPW and IPWRA analyses, I use variables 
likely to be correlated with growth in the share of the population that is foreign-born, Hispanic, 
and/or Asian since 2000. First, I include the percent foreign-born, Hispanic, and Asian in 2000, 
as appropriate depending on the treatment. I include population density (in quartiles) and logged 
population in 2000 as predictors. Immigrant groups are often attracted to large metropolitan areas 
(Portes and Rumbaut 2014), but new destinations have grown as well (Massey 2008). 
Immigrants tend to move to places with more economic opportunities (Borjas 2014), but also 
may end up in relatively low income counties, perhaps for cost of living purposes (Marrow 
2011), and growth of a relatively low income group may lead to relatively lower median 
household income growth. Therefore, I include logged median household income in 2000 and 
median household income growth since 2000 as predictors of the treatment variables. As much of 
the foreign-born, Hispanic, and Asian growth is concentrated in particular states, I include state 
of residence as a predictor of selection into treatment as well.  
5.4. Subsample Analyses 
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One important goal of this study is to examine how the impact of demographic change on 
Trump voting may vary by the personal and contextual characteristics for respondents. One 
obvious distinction is party affiliation/past voting patterns. One might expect Republicans, who 
tend have more negative attitudes toward immigration (B. Jones 2019), to react more negatively 
to demographic change. Indeed, Myers and Levy (2018) find this to be the case in terms of 
exposure to information about Whites becoming a minority.11 In the case of the current study, I 
examine subsamples depending on voting in 2012. While we may expect Romney voters to be 
more negatively impacted by demographic change, we also know that these voters were already 
highly likely to vote for Trump, and it may be non-Romney voters who see the biggest impact. 
Enos (2017) finds results that support such a hypothesis, namely that Anglo Democrats, though 
not Anglo Republicans or Independents, were more likely to vote for Trump in counties 
undergoing higher growth in the Hispanic population. 
Much of the research on backlash to demographic change in the U.S. is focused on the 
reactions of non-Hispanic Whites (Craig and Richeson 2014; Enos 2017; Myers and Levy 2018; 
Newman 2013; Reny, Collingwood, and Valenzuela 2019). The current study will of course 
examine this group, but a growing body of work has also assessed the potential impact of 
demographic change on non-White minority groups (Abascal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018). 
Relative group position may be important when theorizing the relationship between demographic 
change and conservative turns in voting. Blacks may view Hispanics as economic competitors 
given their generally similar class status (Kochhar and Cilluffo 2018), but also may recognize 
similarities between their own experiences of discrimination and those of Hispanics (J. A. Jones 
                                                
11 The authors also find that the framing of information about projected demographic change is 
critically important in predicting how respondents will react and how this varies by party 
affiliation. 
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2011). Asians may find commonality with Hispanics in terms of immigrant or second-generation 
experiences, but divergent class statuses can also generate conflict through employer-employee 
relationships, for instance (Min 2007).  
Like political affiliation, education also tends to be an important predictor of attitudes 
toward immigration in the U.S., with those at higher levels of education expressing more positive 
attitudes (Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). If wage 
competition with relatively “low-skilled” immigrant-origin groups is part of the reason why, we 
may expect relatively low income individuals to express similar attitudes and perhaps be more 
likely vote for Trump in response to demographic change in their communities. However, it is 
not entirely clear that this is the case (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and 
Margalit 2015), and instead the relationship between education and immigration attitudes may be 
driven more by cultural concerns (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Additionally, although there 
are mixed results in the literature (Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Tingley 
2013), there is at least some evidence that concerns about fiscal burden may drive immigration 
concerns in certain circumstances (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 
2007). In the case of the current study, this raises the possibility that relatively well-off 
Americans, those most likely to fear an increased tax burden, may have been driven to Trump as 
a result of demographic change (Nunns et al. 2015).  
Additionally, prior evidence has demonstrated that pre-existing racial/ethnic 
demographics at the local level may be an important factor in predicting the impact of 
demographic change. As touched on above, Newman (2013) finds that anti-immigrant backlash, 
in terms of cultural threat perception, is strong in counties that saw both a large percentage point 
increase in the Hispanic population and had fewer Hispanics to begin with. Drawing on the 
 19 
defended neighborhood hypothesis (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998) and the acculturative 
stress literature12 (Berry 1997), Newman hypothesizes that demographic change is particularly 
disruptive, “culturally threatening,” and likely to cause backlash in places with little pre-existing 
non-White immigrant population. The author describes this as the “acculturating-contexts 
hypothesis.” I apply the same logic to my analyses, separately analyzing counties with different 
racial/ethnic makeups in 2000.  
Lastly, I also perform additional analyses restricting the sample to the swing states and 
the swing states that Trump won, due to the particular importance of these subsamples on the 
election results. I discuss in more detail below how these states may differ from the full sample 
of states in important ways. 
6. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the full sample of counties in the CCES that 
are analyzed in this study, as well as subsamples of counties in the top quartile of foreign-born, 
Hispanic, and Asian percentage point growth. This table uses variables merged into the CCES 
from the 2000 Census and the 2010-2014 American Community Survey. As stated above, the 
number of respondents for the full sample is smaller than what was given in the data section due 
to the exclusion of Alaska and small amounts of missing data for some of the variables. 
Table 1 here 
 The key takeaway here is that counties in the top growth quartiles have substantial 
growth in their respective groups. On average, this is 4.4 percentage points for foreign-born 
growth, 7.6 percentage points for Hispanic growth, and 3.4 percentage points for Asian growth. 
                                                
12 Berry (1997) focuses on acculturative stress for immigrants, while Newman (2013) uses the 
concept in theorizing the experience of native Whites in relatively homogeneous places that are 
rapidly diversifying.  
 20 
In all cases, there is at least twice the growth in these counties compared to the full set of 
observations, indicating that they clearly stand out in terms of demographic change. Though not 
displayed, it is also worth noting that many counties in the high growth categories have quite a 
bit higher growth than the average in their respective groups, further evidencing the unique value 
of these counties in answering the questions in this study. Further examining the counties in the 
top quartile of percentage point growth, these counties already had relatively large populations of 
their respective groups in 2000. The counties with high percentage point growth in the Asian 
population are particularly dense, well off financially, and more highly educated. Counties with 
high percentage point growth in the foreign-born population are doing relatively well in terms of 
median household income and education as well.  
7. Results 
7.1. Logistic Regressions 
Beginning with an analysis of the individual-level survey data from the CCES, Table 2 
shows logistic regressions demonstrating the relationship between the likelihood of voting for 
Trump (vs. all other options including non-voting) and living in a high foreign-born, Hispanic, or 
Asian share growth county. This table will demonstrate whether there is a statistically significant 
relationship between these variables prior to accounting for selection into treatment using the 
AIPW and IPWRA models. The treatments are considered in separate models due to a high level 
of multicollinearity. All CCES analyses presented below are run using post-election weights 
provided by the CCES, as recommended in the survey guide. I report robust standard errors as 
well as statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and .1% levels.  
Table 2 here 
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 Leaving the control variables aside and addressing the key questions of this study, I find 
no statistically significant evidence from logistic regressions that people living in counties with 
rapid percentage point growth in immigrant, Hispanic, or Asian populations were more likely to 
vote for Trump. I do find that people living in counties with rapid foreign-born growth were 
actually less likely to vote for Trump, but the analysis via techniques accounting for selection 
below will address this more rigorously.13  
7.2. Techniques Accounting for Selection into Treatment 
 The analyses below account for selection into treatment using inverse-probability-
weighted models when examining the relationship between the treatment (rapid demographic 
change) and the outcome (Trump voting in the 2016 general election). I use linear probability 
models (LPM) to model the outcome here because of the difficulty of convergence of logit or 
probit models. Though this can be a controversial approach for various reasons, Wooldridge 
(2010, p. 563) points out that “If the main purpose of estimating a binary response model is to 
estimate the partial effects of the explanatory variables, averaged across the distribution of x, 
then the LPM often does a very good job...The fact that some predicted probabilities are outside 
the unit interval need not be a serious concern.” Additionally, the use of robust standard errors 
addresses the potential for heteroskedasticity. I perform robustness checks not presented in this 
article with models excluding the survey weights as well as predicting treatment using only 
percent foreign-born/Hispanic/Asian in 2000 as appropriate, median household income growth, 
and state of residence. “Simplified” models including one of these features or both sometimes 
achieve a better balance between the treatment and control groups in terms of their likelihood of 
                                                
13 In an analysis not presented, I also examine percentage growth, rather than percentage point 
growth, of the key demographic groups, and find no statistically significant results. 
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treatment. The results for these models do not drastically alter any of the conclusions of this 
study. I will describe any notable discrepancies as necessary. 
Table 3 presents the results for these analyses. I exclude cases that are close to violating 
the overlap assumption, those that have extremely high or extremely low probabilities of 
selection into treatment, in order to avoid unstable estimates (StataCorp 2013).  
Table 3 here 
 Table 3 demonstrates that people living in counties in the top quartile of Hispanic growth 
between 2000 and 2010-2014 were more likely to vote for Trump, as compared to all other 
options including non-voting, in the 2016 general election. Voters are estimated to be 3.1 or 4.8 
percentage points more likely to vote for Trump, depending on whether AIPW or IPWRA is 
used. Percentage point growth in the foreign-born and Asian populations seems to have no 
relationship with Trump voting.14 These results echo recent research showing that the reception 
of Hispanic immigration in the United States tends to be relatively negative compared to the 
reception of Asian immigration (Pew Research Center 2015). 
 Tables 4 and 5 dig further into these results, looking at the relationship between high 
Hispanic growth and Trump voting for various subsamples in the general election, as well as 
separately for all respondents who voted in Republican primaries or caucuses. For the general 
election these analyses use the three different definitions of Trump voting mentioned above: 
Trump voting (1) vs. all other options including non-voting (0), Trump voting (1) vs. voting for 
all other candidates (0), and Trump voting (1) vs. Clinton voting (0). For the primary election, I 
examine Trump voting (1) vs. all other Republican primary candidate voting (0). 
                                                
14 Models using percentage growth instead of percentage point growth (not displayed) show no 
statistically significant results for any group. Analyses with certain “simplified” models actually 
demonstrate a negative relationship between foreign-born percent growth and Trump voting. 
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Table 4 here 
Table 5 here 
 Firstly, it is worth noting that the results are fairly consistent regardless of which outcome 
operationalization I use. Table 4 shows that, for the general election across all models, the 
relationship between high Hispanic percentage point growth and Trump voting is consistently 
observed among those who voted for Romney in the 2012 election. It is perhaps surprising that 
Hispanic growth would influence Romney voters in this way, voters who are already highly 
likely to vote for Trump in the first place, but there is also some evidence of a relationship 
between Hispanic growth and Trump voting among Obama voters in the IPWRA models. 
Though this does not replicate to the AIPW models, the “simplified” models show consistent 
statistically significant and positive results for Obama voters, with magnitudes ranging from 2.7 
to 5.5. There is no evidence of an effect of Hispanic growth among those in the “other” voting 
category for 2012. I find that the relationship between Hispanic growth and Trump voting is 
consistently present among non-Hispanic Whites and Asians, though not among non-Hispanic 
Blacks. Non-Hispanic Blacks in high Hispanic growth counties were less likely to vote for 
Trump according to one model (IPWRA, Clinton vs. Trump), but this is not consistent across 
models. The result for Asians is perhaps the most intriguing because of the large magnitude of 
the coefficients: 8.9 to 15.8 percentage points depending on the outcome and model, adding to 
recent research on non-Hispanic minority reactions to Hispanic population growth, or at least 
exposure to information about said growth (Abascal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018). It is 
notable, however, that the “simplified” models have somewhat more modest magnitudes 
(between 4.3 and 11.4), with the Trump vs. Clinton analyses producing non-statistically 
significant p-values in the models excluding survey weights. It should be noted that the sample 
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size of Asians in the CCES is comparatively small and that this makes it difficult to divide the 
sample any further to probe these results more deeply. Lastly, I find that people living in high 
Hispanic percentage point growth counties were more likely to vote for Trump in the Republican 
primaries, providing evidence that this advantage stood for Trump across his campaign.  
Table 5 further divides the sample of non-Hispanic Whites for the general election. The 
models divided by education are limited to those born in 1991 or earlier so that respondents are 
approximately age 25 or older, giving them a reasonable amount of time to have obtained a 
degree. Across all models, I find that non-Hispanic Whites without at least a 4-year degree were 
more likely to vote for Trump in high Hispanic growth counties, as were those in a relatively 
high family income bracket ($80,000 or greater). Alternatively, high Hispanic growth does not 
appear to have an influence on the more highly educated or a consistent influence on the lower 
family income group (less than $50,000) to vote for Trump. These results may seem 
counterintuitive, but fit some of the research described above that suggests that the relationship 
between education and immigration attitudes may be more culturally than economically driven, 
and that those at the higher end of the income spectrum may fear fiscal impacts from the rapid 
growth of a relatively working class population such as Hispanics. Lastly, echoing work from 
Newman (2013), I find that the relationship between Hispanic growth and Trump voting is 
particularly strong in places with lower Hispanic populations to start with, those in the bottom 
half of percent Hispanic in the CCES sample as of 2000 (less than or equal to 5.6 percent 
Hispanic). Within these counties, non-Hispanic Whites were estimated to be 12.3 to 15 
percentage points more likely to vote for Trump if the county experienced high Hispanic growth 
since 2000, depending on the model in question. Alternatively, non-Hispanic Whites living in 
counties in the top half of percent Hispanic as of 2000 were not impacted at a statistically 
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significant level by Hispanic growth in terms of voting patterns. This provides strong evidence 
that Trump’s appeals were particularly effective in places undergoing rapid Hispanic population 
growth for perhaps the first time. 
Given the intriguing results around education and family income, I further interrogate this 
issue by examining additional subsamples of non-Hispanic Whites: 
• Lower education, lower family income 
• Lower education, higher family income 
• Higher education, lower family income 
• Higher education, higher family income 
Lower and higher education/family income are again defined as above. All of these 
samples are limited to those born in 1991 or earlier. These results are presented in Table 6: 
Table 6 here 
 As demonstrated in Table 6, only one group fairly consistently demonstrates a 
statistically significant relationship between high Hispanic population growth in their county and 
Trump voting across all models: non-Hispanic Whites with relatively low levels of education and 
relatively high family incomes. There is only one model for which this result is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level (AIPW, Trump vs. all other candidates), but the p-value in this model 
is very close to statistical significance (p-value = 0.054). The magnitude of this relationship is 
estimated to be between 3.9 and 4.7 percentage points depending on the model. No other group 
demonstrates such a consistent relationship, and those with a higher level of education and lower 
family income even demonstrate some evidence of lower levels of Trump voting in counties with 
high Hispanic growth.  
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 I now turn to the county-level election results compiled by Election Atlas to examine the 
potential impact of rapid demographic change on actual election outcomes, the percent voting for 
Trump and Romney, respectively. A robustness check for the 2016 general election examines the 
gap between Trump and Clinton. Table 7 shows results for AIPW and IPWRA analyses for the 
2016 general and primary elections, as well as the 2012 general election. Additionally, I 
specifically analyze the swing states for both the 2012 and 2016 general elections. 
Table 7 here 
 For the AIPW and IPWRA analyses of the full set of counties, high Hispanic growth 
counties were .548 and .417 percentage points more likely to vote for Trump in the 2016 general 
election. Additionally, the models predicting the difference between Trump voting and Clinton 
voting show a similar result, with a 1.15 or .809 percentage point magnitude depending on the 
model. This provides evidence of an impact of rapid Hispanic growth on the election results. 
However, analyzing the counties in swing states, I find no statistically significant impact of 
Hispanic growth on Trump vote percentage or the difference between Trump and Clinton 
percentage. This provides evidence that rapid Hispanic growth did not necessarily have a 
decisive impact on the 2016 general election. I also find no statistically significant results for the 
primaries, which contrasts with the results from the CCES.  
In addition, controlling for the results in the 2000 election, there is no effect of rapid 
Hispanic percentage point growth on the 2012 election in the full set of counties, and the 
relationship in the swing states appears to be negative. In other words, counties in swing states 
that saw rapid Hispanic growth from 2000 to 2006-2010 were less likely to vote for Romney in 
2012, reminding us that one effect of Hispanic population growth may simply be to add 
Democratic voters to the local population. Evidence in support of this is provided in Table A. 
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Examining Romney voting again, I employ two new treatment variables: a binary variable where 
“1” represents counties in the top quartile of Hispanic citizen voting age population (CVAP) 
growth from 2000 to 2006-2010, and another binary variable where “1” represents counties in 
the top quartile of all other Hispanic growth.15 The idea here is to compare the impact of the 
growth of eligible Hispanic voters to all other Hispanics. Again, there are no statistically 
significant results for the full set of counties, but high growth in the Hispanic CVAP predicts 
lower Romney voting at a statistically significant level in the swing states, while growth in the 
Hispanic population not eligible to vote does not. Returning to Table 7, there are no statistically 
significant results for rapid foreign-born or Asian growth in the 2016 general or primary 
elections, or the 2012 election.  
For Hispanic growth, is it possible that there is an effect in the swing states that is 
concentrated in the higher population counties, those that are ultimately more impactful on the 
election outcome? For a larger sample size, I turn back to the CCES in Table 8. I limit the 
sample to respondents in counties that are in the top quartile of CVAP for 2012-2016 within the 
swing states: 
Table 8 here 
 I find no statistically significant results in Table 8, leading to further uncertainty that 
Hispanic growth had a tangible effect on the 2016 election. Similar results (not displayed) are 
found when analyzing the swing states that Trump won, counties in the top quartile of CVAP 
within the swing states Trump won, and two swing states that Trump won and have ample 
sample sizes for analysis purposes (Florida and Pennsylvania). Again, this leaves a level of 
                                                
15 When the top quartile of Hispanic CVAP growth is the treatment, the model controls for 
whether the county was in the top quartile of Hispanic non-CVAP growth, and vice versa, all for 
2000 to 2006-2010. 
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uncertainty about the true impact of Hispanic growth on the 2016 election, but it should be noted 
that my inability to test all key counties/states is a major limitation in drawing any firm 
conclusions here. 
 What might account for the lack of statistically significant results in the swing states? 
After examining several possibilities, including differences in racial demographics both in 2000 
and at the time of voting, I find the most compelling evidence for differences in the education 
and family income for non-Hispanic Whites in the swing vs. non-swing states. Specifically, non-
Hispanics Whites with lower education and higher family income are notably less common in the 
high Hispanic growth counties of the swing states, the swing states Trump won, the high CVAP 
counties for these subsamples, as well as in Florida and Pennsylvania. There is at least a 5- 
percentage point difference in all cases (among non-Hispanic White U.S. citizens born in 1991 or 
earlier).16 This is the group that showed the highest likelihood of increased Trump voting in high 
Hispanic growth counties in Table 6, which is essentially replicated within the swing states in 
Table B at quite high magnitudes.17 The fact that there are fewer lower education and higher 
income non-Hispanic Whites provides one plausible explanation for why the relationship 
between Hispanic growth and Trump voting is not statistically significant in the swing states.18 
This is, of course, not necessarily the only factor involved.  
8. Conclusion 
In testing the hypotheses of this study, I find no evidence of a backlash effect for rapid 
growth of the foreign-born or Asian populations. However, in analyzing survey data from the 
2016 election, I find robust evidence that those living in counties with a large percentage point 
                                                
16 A similar pattern is found when examining the 2010-2014 ACS Microdata. 
17 One of the models for this group is not statistically significant, but it is close (p-value = 0.61). 
18 It should be noted that the sample size for certain models in Table E is not particularly large. 
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growth in the Hispanic population since 2000 were more likely to vote for Trump in 2016, both 
in the general election and primaries. This is especially notable given that I control for voting 
patterns in the 2012 election. This provides evidence that Hispanic growth pushed voters toward 
Trump. I also find evidence that the general election backlash effect appears among non-
Hispanic Whites and Asians. For non-Hispanic Whites, the relationship is particularly 
concentrated among those with both lower education and higher family income. Lastly, I find 
evidence of a large effect for non-Hispanic Whites who live in places that might be viewed as 
“new destinations” for Hispanics, counties in the bottom half of percent Hispanic in 2000 for the 
CCES sample.  
However, in rigorously testing the above hypotheses on county-level election results, I 
find less evidence that rapid demographic change has had a meaningful benefit for Republicans 
in recent presidential elections. I first test this hypothesis on the full set of counties for the 2016 
general election, and indeed find evidence of a positive effect for high Hispanic growth on 
Trump voting and the difference between Trump and Clinton voting. However, looking at the 
swing states, I find no statistically significant effect of Hispanic population growth. This result 
holds when analyzing subsamples of the CCES that examine the swing states that Trump won, 
the top quartile of CVAP in swing states and the swing states that Trump won, as well as two 
individual swing states that Trump won (Florida and Pennsylvania). Therefore, it is not clear that 
Hispanic growth actually had an impact on the final result of the 2016 election, including the 
primaries, where I also find no statistically significant results in the county-level data. That said, 
it is possible that an effect may be present in key states that I was unable to examine specifically, 
so it is important to be cautious in drawing conclusions, particularly given the evidence of a 
benefit for Trump from Hispanic growth more generally.  
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I also examine the 2012 election while controlling for results in the 2000 election to 
determine if the Republicans may have captured backlash effects prior to the rise of Trump. I 
find that this is not the case in the full set of counties and that, if anything, swing state counties 
with high Hispanic growth from 2000 to 2006-2010 were less likely to vote for Romney. A 
growing Hispanic population translating into more Democratic voters may be at play in these 
analyses.  
This analysis provides several theoretical implications. Firstly, it demonstrates further 
evidence of the potential for a conservatizing impact of rapid demographic change that disrupts 
one’s understanding of the ethno-racial environment and generates threat (Helson 1964; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Hopkins 2009). In the context of this study, this is specifically 
true of Hispanic growth, though not foreign-born or Asian growth, further highlighting the 
stigmatization of Latinx immigration in particular (Chavez 2001; 2008; Pew Research Center 
2015), which may have both racial and class components (Newman and Malhotra 2019). This 
study also provides evidence of the particular benefit of certain types of demographic change to a 
politician with a far right immigration agenda as opposed to more moderate conservatives 
(Pierce 2019), which has implications for understanding the global far right and populist 
movements more generally (Arzheimer 2009; Becker and Fetzer 2017; Goodwin and Milazzo 
2017; Swank and Betz 2003). While this reaction, as expected, is displayed among non-Hispanic 
Whites, there is also evidence of increased Trump voting among Asians, a group that may not 
always see commonality with Hispanics due to divergent class status and reception in the United 
States (Krogstad and Radford 2018; Pew Research Center 2015). I also find strong evidence 
supporting the acculturating-contexts hypothesis, which argues that backlash to demographic 
change will be most likely to occur in places with little pre-existing population of the incoming 
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group (Newman 2013). Lastly, this study provides evidence that socioeconomic status and the 
various concerns it generates are likely important factors in understanding backlash to 
demographic change, with support for the idea that both cultural and financial considerations 
may be important as they relate to education and family income (Facchini and Mayda 2009; 
Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). 
 Ultimately, the results do provide evidence for the impact of Hispanic growth on Trump 
voting. However, that this ultimately had an impact on the 2016 election is uncertain. This 
should provide caution for those claiming that backlash against local demographic change “won” 
Trump the election, but I also cannot rule it out. That said, as demographic changes continue to 
occur across the country, it will be worthwhile to consider the effects of these changes on politics 
at both the local and national levels. My results for counties with low Hispanic populations in 
2000 are particularly instructive. The relationship between high Hispanic growth and Trump 
voting was especially large in these “new destinations.” As the number of new destinations 
across the country increases (Massey 2008), social scientists would do well to pay attention to 
these places, and how voting patterns, policy preferences, and party alignments might change as 
a result of demographic change. Moreover, places with larger Hispanic populations in 2000 did 
not reveal a relationship between Hispanic growth and Trump voting, mirroring past research 
showing that the dynamics of politics and demographic change are perhaps different in such 
places. Whether this is due to long-term selection patterns in and out of these places by Whites or 
the positive long-term effects of contact (or both) is beyond the scope of this study, but it is 
worth keeping in mind the potential for temporal variation in the effects of demographic change 
on political outcomes. Overall, this study can help to inform such research going forward. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for various CCES samples (observations are individual-level, statistics are given at the county-level) 
Variable Full sample 
Top quartile foreign-born pct. 
point growth '00 to '10-14 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. 
point growth '00 to '10-14 
Top quartile Asian pct. point 
growth '00 to '10-14 



















Pct. foreign-born '00 10.2 12.9 15.6 19.3 
 
[9.99] [7.48] [9.16] [11.12] 
Pct. Hispanic '00 11.2 10.8 20.2 17.1 
 
[13.55] [8.6] [13.11] [13.39] 
Pct. Asian '00 3.3 5.0 3.7 8.0 
 
[4.59] [4.73] [2.97] [5.68] 
Pct. bachelor's degree+ (age 25+) '10-14 29.8 35.8 29.1 38.5 
 
[10.56] [10.59] [8.81] [10.61] 
Population density (people/sq. mi.) '10-14 2180.7 2099.6 1591.4 5780.2 
 
[7382.79] [4089.57] [3806.53] [14011.69] 
Median hh income '10-14 $55,918 $66,042 $57,968 $69,072 
 
[14684.46] [18605.58] [15151.04] [16462.82] 
Observations 50,989 12,518 12,341 11,832 
 
           Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010-2014 
 
                                            Note: The sample sizes for the top quartile of percentage point growth of each group vary due to uneven distribution of duplicate growth rates for respondents living in the  




















Table 2. Logistic regressions predicting Trump voting (vs. all other options including non-voting) with demographic 
change variables and controls (observations are individual-level, 2016 general election) 
Variables   
    








 Top quartile Asian pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) 
 
-0.095 
   
[0.073] 
Vote 2012 (ref. = Obama) 
   Romney 3.74*** 3.74*** 3.74*** 
 
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] 
Other 1.15*** 1.15*** 1.15*** 
 
[0.056] [0.056] [0.056] 
Pct. Romney vote 2012 (county-level) 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.0090*** 
 
[0.0022] [0.0023] [0.0022] 
Education (ref. = less than high school) 
   High school graduate 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 
 
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] 
Some college 0.35** 0.35** 0.35** 
 
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] 
2-year degree 0.37** 0.37** 0.37** 
 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] 
4-year degree -0.064 -0.058 -0.055 
 
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] 
Post-grad degree -0.33** -0.33** -0.33** 
 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] 
Family income (ref. = less than $10,000) 
   $10,000 - $19,999 -0.025 -0.02 -0.025 
 
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
$20,000 - $29,999 0.045 0.044 0.047 
 
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
$30,000 - $39,999 0.094 0.098 0.095 
 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] 
$40,000 - $49,999 0.023 0.025 0.023 
 
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
$50,000 - $59,999 0.30* 0.30* 0.30* 
 
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
 4 
$60,000 - $69,999 0.15 0.15 0.16 
 
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14] 
$70,000 - $79,999 0.14 0.14 0.14 
 
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14] 
$80,000 - $99,999  0.23 0.23 0.23 
 
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
$100,000 - $119,999 0.18 0.19 0.18 
 
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14] 
$120,000 - $149,999 0.13 0.14 0.14 
 
[0.15] [0.15] [0.15] 
$150,000 or greater -0.016 -0.011 -0.0065 
 
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14] 
Prefer not to say 0.19 0.19 0.19 
 
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
Employment status (ref. = full-time) 
   Part-time 0.018 0.017 0.017 
 
[0.074] [0.074] [0.074] 
Temporarily laid off 0.27 0.26 0.27 
 
[0.28] [0.28] [0.28] 
Unemployed -0.21* -0.21* -0.21* 
 
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] 
Retired -0.15** -0.16** -0.15** 
 
[0.058] [0.059] [0.058] 
Permanently disabled -0.023 -0.026 -0.03 
 
[0.095] [0.095] [0.095] 
Homemaker -0.23** -0.23** -0.23** 
 
[0.076] [0.076] [0.075] 
Student -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 
 
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
Other -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
 
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14] 
Race/ethnicity (ref. = White) 
   Black -1.52*** -1.52*** -1.53*** 
 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] 
Hispanic -0.45** -0.48** -0.42* 
 
[0.17] [0.17] [0.17] 
Asian -0.63*** -0.62*** -0.60*** 
 
[0.15] [0.15] [0.15] 
Native American 0.043 0.044 0.039 
 
[0.24] [0.24] [0.24] 
Mixed -0.54*** -0.54*** -0.53*** 
 
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
Other 0.2 0.2 0.2 
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[0.17] [0.17] [0.17] 
Middle Eastern -0.97** -0.96** -0.94** 
 
[0.33] [0.32] [0.32] 
Hispanic identification (ref. = Hispanic) 
   Non-Hispanic 0.37* 0.40** 0.37* 
 
[0.15] [0.15] [0.15] 
Immigrant generation (ref. = foreign-born citizen) 
   Second generation (at least 1 foreign-born parent) -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 
 
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] 
Third generation (at least 1 foreign-born grandparent) -0.12 -0.12 -0.15 
 
[0.099] [0.099] [0.098] 
Fourth generation+ -0.19* -0.19* -0.22* 
 
[0.096] [0.096] [0.095] 
Female -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27*** 
 
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] 
Birth year -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 
[0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] 
Union membership (ref. = never) 
   Current 0.078 0.078 0.081 
 
[0.082] [0.082] [0.081] 
Former 0.047 0.048 0.043 
 
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052] 
Child under age 18 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 
 
[0.054] [0.055] [0.054] 
Marital status (ref. = married) 
   Separated -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 
 
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
Divorced -0.17** -0.16** -0.16** 
 
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] 
Widowed -0.06 -0.057 -0.057 
 
[0.084] [0.084] [0.084] 
Single -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.30*** 
 
[0.063] [0.063] [0.063] 
Domestic partnership -0.23* -0.24* -0.24* 
 
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] 
Population density at county-level (ref. = least dense quartile) 
  25-50% -0.04 -0.018 -0.039 
 
[0.063] [0.063] [0.063] 
50-75% -0.11 -0.095 -0.077 
 
[0.076] [0.076] [0.077] 
Most dense quartile -0.071 -0.0046 0.05 
 
[0.095] [0.09] [0.095] 
Pct. in labor force '10-14 (age 16+, county-level) -0.014** -0.013** -0.011* 
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[0.0049] [0.0048] [0.0048] 
Time at current residence (ref. = less than 1 year) 
   1-2 years 0.16 0.16 0.16 
 
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09] 
3-4 years 0.22* 0.22* 0.22* 
 
[0.088] [0.088] [0.088] 
5 or more years 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 
[0.076] [0.076] [0.076] 










 Non-Asian population change '00 to '10-14 
  
0.0015 
   
[0.0017] 










 Pct. Asian '00 
  
-0.011 
   
[0.0092] 
Constant 20.2*** 20.1*** 19.9*** 
 
[4.19] [4.19] [4.19] 
    Observations 50,989 50,989 50,989 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
   
    Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010-
2014 
Note: Control for state of residence not displayed. 
















Table 3. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting (vs. all other including non-voters) with demographic change variables 
(observations are individual-level, 2016 general election) 
 
  AIPW IPWRA 
Top quartile foreign-born pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient -0.026 -0.002 
 
Robust standard error 0.084 0.007 
 
Observations 44,112 44,112 
    Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient       0.048***       0.031*** 
 
Robust standard error 0.009 0.008 
 
Observations 42,048 42,048 
    Top quartile Asian pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.114 0.013 
 
Robust standard error 0.075 0.013 
 
Observations 39,623 39,623 
 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
   
    Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010-2014 
 
Note: All models control for presidential voting in 2012 at the individual and county level, education, family income, employment status, race/ethnicity, Hispanic 
identity, immigrant generation, gender, birth year, current/former union membership, parental/guardian status (children under 18), marital status, state of residence, 
length of current residence, and population density and labor force participation (age 16+) at the county level in 2010-2014. The models for foreign-born growth control 
for percent foreign-born in 2000 and the U.S.-born population change from 2000 to 2010-2014, both at the county level.  The models for Hispanic growth control for 
percent Hispanic in 2000 and the non-Hispanic population change from 2000 to 2010-2014, both at the county level. The models for Asian growth control for percent 



















Table 4. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are individual-level, 2016 general and primary elections) 
 




General election (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting) 
  
Obama 2012 voters Romney 2012 voters 
Other 2012 voters 
(or non-voters) Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Asian 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient 0.019     0.027** 0.007     0.044** -0.0036     0.112** 
(3.5 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth for the non-
Hispanic Black subsample, 4 pct. points or more of 
Hispanic growth for the Asian subsample) Robust standard error 0.012 0.009 0.016 0.015 0.026 0.038 
  Observations 18,692 13,063 9,180 30,733 4,023 1,211 




General election (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting) 
  
Obama 2012 voters Romney 2012 voters 
Other 2012 voters 
(or non-voters) Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Asian 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient       0.048***     0.022** -0.012       0.043*** -0.026     0.097** 
(3.5 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth for the non-
Hispanic Black subsample, 4 pct. points or more of 
Hispanic growth for the Asian subsample) Robust standard error 0.009 0.008 0.015 0.01 0.014 0.032 
  Observations 18,692 13,063 9,180 30,733 4,023 1,211 




General election (Trump vs. all candidates) 
  
Obama 2012 voters Romney 2012 voters 
Other 2012 voters 
(or non-voters) Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Asian 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient 0.02       0.032*** -0.006     0.051** -0.015   0.158* 
(3.5 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth for the non-
Hispanic Black subsample, 4 pct. points or more of 
Hispanic growth for the Asian subsample) Robust standard error 0.013 0.008 0.019 0.017 0.028 0.067 
  Observations 17,832 12,667 5,151 27,051 3,461 959 




General election (Trump vs. all candidates) 
  
Obama 2012 voters Romney 2012 voters 
Other 2012 voters 
(or non-voters) Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Asian 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient       0.052***       0.027*** -0.02       0.048*** -0.021     0.108** 
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(3.5 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth for the non-
Hispanic Black subsample, 4 pct. points or more of 
Hispanic growth for the Asian subsample) Robust standard error 0.01 0.007 0.02 0.01 0.016 0.038 
  Observations 17,832 12,667 5,151 27,051 3,461 959 




General election (Trump vs. Clinton) 
  
Obama 2012 voters Romney 2012 voters 
Other 2012 voters 
(or non-voters) Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Asian 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient 0.019       0.025*** -0.007     0.043** -0.021   0.147* 
(3.5 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth for the non-
Hispanic Black subsample, 4 pct. points or more of 
Hispanic growth for the Asian subsample) Robust standard error 0.013 0.007 0.02 0.013 0.027 0.075 
  Observations 16,754 11,639 4,072 24,550 3,298 883 




General election (Trump vs. Clinton) 
  
Obama 2012 voters Romney 2012 voters 
Other 2012 voters 
(or non-voters) Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Asian 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient       0.052***       0.021*** -0.009       0.051***   -0.037*   0.089* 
(3.5 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth for the non-
Hispanic Black subsample, 4 pct. points or more of 
Hispanic growth for the Asian subsample) Robust standard error 0.01 0.005 0.018 0.009 0.015 0.036 
  Observations 16,754 11,639 4,072 24,550 3,298 883 
        
  
Republican primary (Trump vs. all candidates) 
    
  
AIPW IPWRA 
    Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient   0.033*   0.03* 
    
 
Robust standard error 0.015 0.014 
    
 
Observations 9,853 9,853 
    
        *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
       
        Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010-2014 
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Notes: Generally, models control for presidential voting in 2012 at the individual and county level, education, family income, employment status, race/ethnicity, Hispanic identity, immigrant generation, gender, birth year, current/former union 
membership, parental/guardian status (children under 18), marital status, state of residence, length of current residence, population density and labor force participation (age 16+) at the county level in 2010-2014, percent Hispanic at the county 
level in 2000, and the non-Hispanic population change at the county level from 2000 to 2010-2014. A control is excluded if it is not necessary for the subsample. For instance, the controls for race/ethnicity and Hispanic identity are not included 
for the subsamples by race/ethnicity/Hispanic identity. Analysis by education level is limited to those born in 1991 or earlier. California, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia are 








































Table 5. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are individual-level, 2016 general election, non-Hispanic Whites only) 
        
  
AIPW (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting) 
  
No 4-yr. degree 4-yr. degree plus 
Less than $50,000 
family income 
$80,000 or greater 
family income 
5.6% Hispanic or 
less '00 (county-level) 
Greater than 5.6% 
pct. Hispanic '00 
(county-level) 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient     0.045** -0.022 0.022       0.057***   0.123* 0.006 
 
Robust standard error 0.015 0.036 0.026 0.014 0.055 0.009 
 
Observations 17,775 10,866 10,571 8,579 8,405 15,354 
        
  
IPWRA (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting) 
  
No 4-yr. degree 4-yr. degree plus 
Less than $50,000 
family income 
$80,000 or greater 
family income 
5.6% Hispanic or 
less '00 (county-level) 
Greater than 5.6% 
pct. Hispanic '00 
(county-level) 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient     0.037** 0.016     0.038**       0.055***   0.128* 0.012 
 
Robust standard error 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.05 0.008 
 
Observations 17,775 10,866 10,571 8,579 8,405 15,354 
        
  
AIPW (Trump vs. all candidates) 
  
No 4-yr. degree 4-yr. degree plus 
Less than $50,000 
family income 
$80,000 or greater 
family income 
5.6% Hispanic or 
less '00 (county-level) 
Greater than 5.6% 
pct. Hispanic '00 
(county-level) 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient     0.047** -0.018 0.029       0.054***   0.131* -0.004 
 
Robust standard error 0.014 0.038 0.021 0.014 0.053 0.009 
 
Observations 15,033 10,323 8,529 8,101 7,217 13,696 
        
  
IPWRA (Trump vs. all candidates) 
  
No 4-yr. degree 4-yr. degree plus 
Less than $50,000 
family income 
$80,000 or greater 
family income 
 5.6% Hispanic or 
less '00 (county-level) 
Greater than 5.6% 
pct. Hispanic '00 
(county-level) 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient       0.047*** 0.014     0.036**       0.056***     0.142** 0.0009 
 
Robust standard error 0.01 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.047 0.008 
 
Observations 15,033 10,323 8,529 8,101 7,217 13,696 
        
  
AIPW (Trump vs. Clinton) 
  
No 4-yr. degree 4-yr. degree plus 
Less than $50,000 
family income 
$80,000 or greater 
family income 
5.6% Hispanic or 
less '00 (county-level) 
Greater than 5.6% 
pct. Hispanic '00 
(county-level) 
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Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient   0.025* -0.013 0.01       0.052***     0.135** -0.015 
 
Robust standard error 0.011 0.037 0.018 0.014 0.047 0.008 
 
Observations 13,870 9,220 7,716 7,384 6,594 12,491 
        
  
IPWRA (Trump vs. Clinton) 
  
No 4-yr. degree 4-yr. degree plus 
Less than $50,000 
family income 
$80,000 or greater 
family income 
5.6% Hispanic or 
less '00 (county-level) 
Greater than 5.6% 
pct. Hispanic '00 
(county-level) 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 
(county-level) Coefficient       0.038*** 0.009   0.033*       0.052***     0.151** -0.008 
 
Robust standard error 0.01 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.047 0.008 
 
Observations 13,870 9,220 7,716 7,384 6,594 12,491 
        *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
       
        Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010-2014 
 
   Note: All models control for presidential voting in 2012 at the individual and county level, education, family income, employment status, immigrant generation, gender, birth year, current/former union membership, parental/guardian 
status (children under 18), marital status, state of residence, length of current residence, population density and labor force participation (age 16+) at the county level in 2010-2014, percent Hispanic at the county level in 2000, and the 



























Table 6. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are individual-level, 2016 general 
election, non-Hispanic Whites only with varying levels of education and family income) 
      
  
AIPW (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.025   0.041* -0.11 0.025 
 
Robust standard error 0.022 0.02 0.084 0.025 
 
Observations 8,034 3,259 1,997 4,970 
      
  
IPWRA (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.029   0.047* -0.034 0.02 
 
Robust standard error 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.018 
 
Observations 8,034 3,259 1,997 4,970 
      
  
AIPW (Trump vs. all candidates) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.024 0.039 -0.088 0.016 
 
Robust standard error 0.02 0.02 0.048 0.026 
 
Observations 6,318 3,016 1,828 4,773 
      
  
IPWRA (Trump vs. all candidates) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.025   0.046*   -0.044* 0.02 
 
Robust standard error 0.015 0.019 0.02 0.018 
 
Observations 6,318 3,016 1,828 4,773 
      
  
AIPW (Trump vs. Clinton) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.002   0.039*   -0.072* 0.02 
 
Robust standard error 0.018 0.019 0.032 0.026 
 
Observations 5,787 2,824 1,580 4,246 
      
  




lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.02   0.044*     -0.053** 0.02 
 
Robust standard error 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.017 
 
Observations 5,787 2,824 1,580 4,246 
      *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
     
      Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010-2014 
 
Notes: Lower education = no 4-yr. degree, higher education = 4-yr. degree plus. Lower family income = less than $50,000, higher family income = $80,000 or greater. All models control for 
presidential voting in 2012 at the individual and county level, education, family income, employment status, immigrant generation, gender, birth year, current/former union membership, 
parental/guardian status (children under 18), marital status, state of residence, length of current residence, population density and labor force participation (age 16+) at the county level in 2010-2014, 
































Table 7. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump/Romney voting with demographic change variables (observations are county-level, percentage point method, 2016 general and 
Republican primary elections, 2012 general election) 




2016 general (pct. Trump vote) 
2016 general (pct. Trump vote - pct. 
Clinton vote) 
2016 Republican 
primary 2012 general 
  
All Swing states All Swing states All All Swing states 
         Top quartile foreign-born pct. point growth (county-level) Coefficient 0.066 0.131 0.028 0.003 1.36 -0.007 -0.794 
 
Robust standard error 0.131 0.409 0.234 0.7 0.807 0.318 1.32 
 
Observations 3,096 886 3,096 886 2,382 3,092 886 
         Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth (county-level) Coefficient   0.548* -0.274   1.15* -0.446 0.547 -0.178   -1.13* 
 
Robust standard error 0.267 0.235 0.541 0.465 0.875 0.356 0.452 
  Observations 2,895 705 2,895 705 2,181 2,895 705 
         Top quartile Asian pct. point growth (county-level) Coefficient -0.205 -0.319 0.039 -0.7 3.17 -0.278 -2.53 
 
Robust standard error 0.363 0.251 0.592 0.498 2.29 0.611 2.68 
 
Observations 3,087 881 3,087 881 2,384 3,089 884 




2016 general (pct. Trump vote) 
2016 general (pct. Trump vote - pct. 
Clinton vote) 
2016 Republican 
primary 2012 general 
  
All Swing states All Swing states All All Swing states 
         Top quartile foreign-born pct. point growth (county-level) Coefficient 0.218 0.012 0.289 -0.203 0.483 -0.05 -0.531 
 
Robust standard error 0.123 0.2 0.224 0.354 0.358 0.211 0.3 
 
Observations 3,096 886 3,096 886 2,382 3,092 886 
         Top quartile Hispanic pct. point growth (county-level) Coefficient     0.417** -0.12     0.809** -0.187 0.8 -0.315     -0.941** 
 
Robust standard error 0.144 0.223 0.257 0.441 0.429 0.26 0.336 
 
Observations 2,895 705 2,895 705 2,181 2,895 705 
         Top quartile Asian pct. point growth (county-level) Coefficient 0.025 -0.359 -0.161 -0.715 0.346 -0.124 -0.243 
 
Robust standard error 0.116 0.199 0.212 0.399 0.347 0.242 0.371 
 
Observations 3,087 881 3,087 881 2,384 3,089 884 
         *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
        
         Sources: Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2006-2010 and 2010-2014 
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Notes: Demographic growth variables measured from 2000 to 2010-2014 for the 2016 election and 2000 to 2006-2010 for the 2012 election. All models control for, at the county level, percent non-Hispanic Black, percent with a 
bachelors degree or higher (age 25+), population density, median household income growth, labor force participation rate (age 16+), percent never married (age 15+), percent age 65 plus, and percent female. All of these variables are 
measured for 2010-2014 for the 2016 elections and 2006-2010 for the 2012 elections, except for median household income growth, which is measured from 2000 to 2010-2014 for the 2016 elections, and 2000 to 2006-2010 for the 
2012 election. All models control for state. The models predicting Trump vote percent (in the general and primary) control for Romney vote percent in 2012, the models predicting the difference between Trump and Clinton voting 
control for the difference between Obama and Romney voting in 2012, and the models predicting Romney vote percent control for Bush vote percent in 2000, all at the county level. The models for foreign-born growth control for 
percent foreign-born in 2000, percent Hispanic and Asian (2010-2014 for the 2016 models and 2006-2010 for the 2012 models) and the U.S.-born population change (2000 to 2010-2014 for the 2016 models and 2000 to 2006-2010 for 
the 2012 models), all at the county level.  The models for Hispanic growth control for percent Hispanic in 2000, percent foreign-born and Asian (2010-2014 for the 2016 models and 2006-2010 for the 2012 models) and the non-
Hispanic population change (2000 to 2010-2014 for the 2016 models and 2000 to 2006-2010 for the 2012 models), all at the county level.  The models for Asian growth control for percent Asian in 2000, percent foreign-born and 
Hispanic (2010-2014 for the 2016 models and 2006-2010 for the 2012 models) and the non-Asian population change (2000 to 2010-2014 for the 2016 models and 2000 to 2006-2010 for the 2012 models), all at the county level. 
California, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia are excluded from the Republican primary analyses because Trump had effectively won the nomination by the times 



































Table 8. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are individual-level, 2016 general election, counties in top quartile 
of citizen voting age population (2012-2016) within swing states) 
   	 	
  
 Counties in top quartile of CVAP within swing states 
  
  AIPW   
  
 (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting)  (Trump vs. all candidates)  (Trump vs. Clinton) 
4 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient -0.019 -0.014 -0.013 
 
Robust standard error 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 
Observations 9,540 8,443 7,821 
     
  
 Counties in top quartile of CVAP within swing states 
  
  IPWRA   
  
 (Trump vs. all other options including non-voting)  (Trump vs. all candidates)  (Trump vs. Clinton) 
4 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient -0.014 -0.007 -0.004 
 
Robust standard error 0.012 0.013 0.012 
 
Observations 9,540 8,443 7,821 
     *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
  	 	
   	 	Sources: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010-2014, 2012-2016 
 
Note: All models control for presidential voting in 2012 at the individual and county level, education, family income, employment status, race/ethnicity, Hispanic identity, immigrant generation, gender, birth year, current/former 
union membership, parental/guardian status (children under 18), marital status, length of current residence, state of residence, and population density and labor force participation (age 16+) at the county level in 2010-2014. All models 




















Table A. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Romney voting with percentage point growth in Hispanic citizen voting age population 
(CVAP) vs. percentage point growth in all other Hispanics (observations are county-level, 2012 general election) 




All Swing states All Swing states 
      Top quartile Hispanic CVAP pct. point growth '00 to '06-10 (county-level) Coefficient -0.183       -1.75*** -0.285       -1.78*** 
 
Robust standard error 0.349 0.397 0.244 0.34 
 
Observations 2,878 778 2,878 778 




All Swing states All Swing states 
      Top quartile Hispanic non-CVAP pct. point growth '00 to '06-10 (county-level) Coefficient -0.065 -0.502 -0.074 -0.535 
 
Robust standard error 0.224 0.366 0.206 0.345 
 
Observations 2,964 865 2,964 865 
      *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
   	 	
    	 	Sources: Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2006-2010 
 	 	
Notes: All models control for Bush vote percent and percent Hispanic at the county level, both for 2000. All models control for, at the county level, percent foreign-
born, percent Asian, percent non-Hispanic Black, percent with a bachelors degree or higher (age 25+), population density, median household income, median household 
income growth, labor force participation rate (age 16+), percent never married (age 15+), percent age 65 plus, percent female, and non-Hispanic population change. All 
of these variables are measured for 2006-2010 except for median house income growth and non-Hispanic population change, which are measured from 2000 to 2006-
2010. All models control for state. When the top quartile of Hispanic CVAP growth is the treatment, the model controls for whether the county was in the top quartile of 
















Table B. AIPW and IPWRA models predicting Trump voting with high Hispanic percentage point growth (observations are individual-level, 2016 general election, 
non-Hispanic whites in the swing states with varying levels of education and family income) 
      
  
AIPW (Trump vs. all other including non-voters)
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
4 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.012   0.108* 0.039 0.053 
 
Robust standard error 0.037 0.044 0.07 0.036 
 
Observations 2,086 935 645 1,542 
      
  
IPWRA (Trump vs. all other including non-voters) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
4 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.016     0.118** 0.003 0.054 
 
Robust standard error 0.033 0.039 0.037 0.03 
 
Observations 2,086 935 645 1,542 
      
  
AIPW (Trump vs. all candidates) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
4 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.009     0.113** 0.029 0.05 
 
Robust standard error 0.055 0.043 0.075 0.036 
 
Observations 1,519 866 585 1,503 
      
  
IPWRA (Trump vs. all candidates) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
4 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.052     0.109** -0.012 0.05 
 
Robust standard error 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.03 
 
Observations 1,519 866 585 1,503 
      
  
AIPW (Trump vs. Clinton) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
4 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient -0.018 0.091 0.023 0.061 
 
Robust standard error 0.056 0.049 0.062 0.031 
 
Observations 1,428 818 521 1,374 
      
  
IPWRA (Trump vs. Clinton) 
  
Lower education, 
lower family income 
Lower education, 
higher family income 
Higher education, 
lower family income 
Higher education, 
higher family income 
4 pct. points or more of Hispanic growth '00 to '10-14 (county-level) Coefficient 0.042   0.085* -0.019   0.05* 
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Robust standard error 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.028 
 
Observations 1,428 818 521 1,374 
      *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
     
      Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016, Election Atlas, Census 2000, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010-2014 
 
  Notes: Lower education = no 4-yr. degree, higher education = 4-yr. degree plus. Lower family income = less than $50,000, higher family income = $80,000 or greater. All models control for presidential 
voting in 2012 at the individual and county level, education, family income, employment status, immigrant generation, gender, birth year, current/former union membership, parental/guardian status (children 
under 18), marital status, state of residence, length of current residence, population density and labor force participation (age 16+) at the county level in 2010-2014, percent Hispanic at the county level in 
2000, and the non-Hispanic population change at the county level from 2000 to 2010-2014. All analyses are limited to those born in 1991 or earlier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
